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BALANCE OF HARDSHIP-INJUNCTION RELIEF

BALANCE OF HARDSHIPINJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Wendell H. Shanner*

H

equity has protected owners of property in the legitimate enjoyment of the benefits of
ownership by its injunctive decree.
This powerful
weapon, fashioned by the chancellor, for the purpose of
making dominant the equity law in its struggle with the
common law, has found frequent use in the field of torts
as well as in the domain of contract. Particularly those
continuing torts such as nuisances and permanent or continuing trespasses, the injurious consequences of which
are essentially cumulative, readily lent themselves to the
restorative therapeutics of the writ of injunction. In this
field, however, the executive character of early equitable intervention survived the accumulation of precedents
and the crystalization of equitable rules as a phase of
the doctrine of judicial discretion. Accordingly, it is
said that the writ of injunction issues ex gratia and not
ex debito justitiae.
The mechanical revolution and the application of
power to the production of goods accomplished such
fundamental changes in the economic structure of the
American Republic as to impose on courts and legislative bodies the necessity of modifying, extending or restricting many of the rights of property theretofore
known to the law. As might have been anticipated, the
relatively flexible character of equitable principles and
remedies placed the chancellor in the vanguard of "judicial legislators." The conflict between the "legitimate,"
economic or socially desirable uses of property broadened immeasurably the field whereon the chancellor with
his injunctive armament was to play the part of arbiISTORICALLY,
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ter or ally. The notion that the writ of injunction is not
of course but of grace and its offspring the so-called
doctrine of the "balance of hardship"-their existence
or non-existence, their proper meaning and application,
the extent to which "state of mind" of one or both of
the parties litigant, laches, fraud and other circumstances shall control or condition their application-are
the structural framework of innumerable decrees in the
fields of nuisance, trespass and equitable servitudes.
Irreconcilable conflict among the several jurisdictions
of this country, and even in the decisions of particular
states, coupled with much diversity of judicial expression and emphasis, renders rather difficult a precise and
systematic survey of the decisions of the several jurisdiction. Accordingly, nothing more than a somewhat
critical and suggestive analysis has been undertaken.
With considerable unanimity courts of equity have
balanced hardships and refused the protection of the
injunctive writ where the interest of the complainant
is small absolutely, i. e., the pecuniary injury which he
has suffered or may suffer by reason of defendant's
wrongful invasion of his property rights is slight, while
the injunction will prove burdensome to defendant or
the public.
A few illustrative cases will be considered:
In McCann v. Chasm Power Company, 211 N. Y.,
301, an injunction was denied upon complainant's application to restrain the defendant from permanently flooding certain lands owned by complainant.
Defendant, an electric power company, had invested $97,000.
Its dam caused an increase in the height of water through
348 feet of the stream upon which complainant's land
abutted. These facts were known to complainant when
he acquired the property. The court observes:
"An equity court is not bound to decree an injunction where
it will produce great public or private mischief, merely for the
purpose of protecting a technical or unsubstantial right."
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While there would have followed inconvenience and
loss to the public generally had the injunction issued
and the defendant failed to purchase its peace by acquiring the right to flood complainant's lands, the hardship to defendant seems to have been the principal determinative fact.
Injunctive relief against a trespass which amounted
to an eviction of the complainant was denied against the
defendant in Lynch v. Union Institution for Savings, 159
Mass., 306. Defendant owned the reversion and complainant was lessee. Defendant had appropriated a
space having a floor area of 13x12 feet and had erected
thereon a masonry wall enclosing one of the vaults in
which it kept securities. Complainant paid $15 a month
rent and the cost of defendant to remove the erection
would have been $3,500. Defendant offered complainant equivalent space in another part of the basement.
The court in denying relief said:
"It would be inequitable, under the circumstances of this case,
to compel the defendant to expend $3500, and to suffer, in addition, great inconvenience and loss in its business, simply to enable the complainant to enjoy for a year and a half the use of
the basement including the space in one corner, 13x1 2 feet, instead of the same basement without that space, and with a greater
space added to it on the opposite side toward the front. The
case shows no such deliberately wrongful conduct on the part
of the defendant as should deprive it of the benefit of equities
such as these."

In Wilkins v. Diven, 106 Kans. 283, the court went a
step further, and by active intervention restrained the
defendant from exercising certain rights appurtenant to
an easement. Defendant owned a city lot improved
with a dwelling house which was supplied with water
by a conduit connecting defendant's house with that of
the complainant in the basement of which was located
the well from which the water was taken. Defendant
undertook to repair the connecting pipe, which necessitated entry upon the lands of complainant. The court
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enjoined such entry for the reason that changed conditions brought about by the community's growth made the
destruction of the easement socially desirable. While
"changed conditions" supply the "atmosphere" of the
opinion, it is apparent that the slight loss to defendant
is the real reason for the injunction.
In Scott v. Glenwood, 105 Kans., 603, the court refused to enjoin the maintenance of a culvert that caused
water to stand upon complainant's garden. The court
said, in part:
"It has been held that whether a structure or a use is unreasonable, and the injury complained of is serious or substantial,

is a question for the determination of the trial court, and if the
injury, although technically wrong, is only slight and trivial, the
plaintiff is ordinarily not entitled to injunctive relief."

If, however, the defendant has been guilty of deliberate misconduct in his interference with the rights of the

complainant an injunction will issue to protect complainant's property rights, irrespective of their value. Trespass and equitable servitude cases exhibit most strikingly
situations of this type.
See Kershishian v. Johnson, 210 Mass. 135. Curtis Mfg. Co.
v. Spencer Wire Co., 203 Mass. 448. Nechman v. Supplee, et al,
236 Mich. 116.

The case of Curtis Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Wire Co.,
supra, presents the situation of a complainant seeking a
mandatory injunction to compel the defendant to remove
its foundation to the extent of its projection into complainant's land. The encroachment was entirely beneath
the surface of the land and extended a distance of 2.46
feet into complainant's land for a length of 55.4 feet.
The defendant was notified of its encroachment by complainant prior to the erection of the building, which
rested upon the encroaching foundation. The court,
after terming the trespass plain and intentional, continues as follows:
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"We see no redeeming feature in the case before us so far as
respects the manner of the trespass. Nor do we think that the
fact that an injunction will impose upon the defendant an expense disproportionate to the apparent benefit to the plaintiff is
of itself enough to deprive the latter of its right to an injunction."
The interest of the public in trespass cases is generally

less conspicuous than in the nuisance cases, and accordingly in such cases, the courts give less prominence to the
balance of hardships doctrine. Not infrequently courts
that recognize the doctrine take the position, in the equitable servitude cases, that a defendant cannot well object
to a decree that requires of him an observance of the requirements or undertakings of his contract. Such reasoning seems cumulative in character, as injunctive relief
should in no wise depend upon the contractial character
of the violated right.
The refusal of injunctive relief may result in hardship
to the complainant which, though substantial, is small
relative to the hardship that its issuance will occasion to
the defendant and to the public generally.
Under such circumstances the English rule excludes
consideration of relative hardships and requires that the

injunction issue if injunctive relief be otherwise appropriate. See Cowper v. Laidler, 2 Chancery Div. 337
(1903).
The English rule has been followed in a number of
American jurisdictions, and finds what is perhaps its
fullest and best exposition in the case of Hulbert v. California PortlandCement Co., 161 Cal., 239. In that case
complainants, adjacent landowners, were seeking an injunction to restrain the defendant from releasing large

quantities of lime and raw mix which was a finely ground
mixture of clay and lime, from its kilns. The evidence
showed that the defendant had invested $800,000 in the
development of its plant; that at the time of its location
at its then site the surrounding land was not planted with
trees or other vegetation; that the company employed
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500 men who were paid $35,000 per month; and that
most of the supplies and materials, amounting in value
to $35,000 per month, was purchased in the vicinity; that
the defendant was employing the most advanced methods
of manufacturing; was constantly investigating the problem of reducing the quantities of raw mix which were
allowed to escape upon the lands of adjacent owners.
The court reviews the authorities and decides that the
temporary injunction should be suffered to remain effective pending final hearing. The court characterizes as an
excellent statement of the rule the following paragraph
quoted from the dissenting opinion of Judge Hawley in
Mountain Copper Co. v. United States, 142 Fed., 625.
"The pith, point, and substance of this whole matter is that
where the acts of a party, whether individuals or corporations,
wealthy or poor, destroy the substance of complainant's estate,
whether it be of great or of but little value, an injunction should
be issued. This is the underlying principle, the essence and effect of all the decisions upon the subject which distinguish this
character of cases from those where the injury is slight and trivial
and the damage not irreparable and not absolutely destructive of
complainant's estate."

The reasons ordinarily given by the courts that refuse
to balance hardships are (1) That to do so would deprive the poor of their property for the benefit of the
rich; (2) That remitting the complainant to his common
law remedy compels him to accept damages in exchange
for his property, thereby creating a sort of private eminent domain in violation of the spirit if not of the letter
of the Constitution. See Hennessey v. Carmony, et ux,
50 N. J. Eq., 616; and (3) The general public interest
will be best served by requiring all persons to respect the
property rights of others. Mobile & 0. R. Co. v. Zimmern, 206 Ala., 37.
While the rule that requires the chancellor to compare
the hardship that injunctive relief will inflict upon the defendant and the public generally with the hardship that
refusal of such relief will impose upon the complainant,
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ana if comparatively the former is much greater than the
latter, refuse to assist the complainant, is the minority
rule, the current tendency is undoubtedly toward a more
general recognition of its wisdom and fairness.
In Bliss v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. (1909), 167
Fed., 342, the court refused to enjoin the operation of a
great copper smelter built at a cost of $9,500,000 and
smelting 7,000 tons of ore per day. There was no question of the injury to complainant's farm produced by the
poisonous fumes of the smelter. Hunt, District Judge,
in stating and applying this doctrine, said:
"I need not dwell on the question of power, for it is too well
established that, from an ancient date, with regard to nuisance,
courts of equity have jurisdiction, based upon the reasonable certainty of irreparable mischief, that sort of material injury by one
to the comfort of another, which requires the application of a
power to prevent, as well as to remedy, the evil (citing authorities) but will pass to the point of close bearing upon the original question, that of discretion where injury of the character
proved in this case is threatened to be continued. In my opinion, where there is presented a conflict of rights, it is the duty
of a court of equity, in protecting those of the complainant, to
consider those of the defendant, and in doing so it may consider
also the injuries that may result to others by issuing the writ of
injunction."

To the same effect, see Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa., 105.
Complainant owned and occupied a dwelling on a bluff
about 70 feet above the nearest furnace floor of defendant's iron puddling works. When the wind was
toward complainant's house his property was constantly
enveloped in a cloud of coal smoke. Plaintiff operated a
small cotton cloth manufacturing plant on the premises,
and it appeared from the evidence that his fabrics were
discolored and deteriorated by the coal smoke from defendant's plant. The court apparently felt that the
remedy at law was adequate, and after so observing
proceeded to say:
"It seems to be supposed that, as at law, whenever a case is
made out of wrongful acts on the one side and consequent in-
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jury on the other, a decree to restrain the act complained of, must
as certainly follow, as a judgment would follow a verdict in a
common-law court. This is a mistake. It is elementary law,
that in equity a decree is never of right, as a judgment at law is,
but of grace. Hence the chancellor will consider whether he
would not do a greater injury by enjoining than would result from
refusing, and leaving the party to his redress at the hands of a
court and jury * * * We think this is a safe rule, and that the
case we are considering is within it."

'A succinct but clear and adequate statement of the doctrine is found in Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 Fed.
(2d), 736. Plaintiff was the owner of a summer residence located less than a mile from the defendant's slate
crushing mill. Defendant's operations resulted in the
pollution of a stream that ran through the lands of
plaintiff, in the deposit of slate dust on plaintiff's land and
in recurring jars to plaintiff's house, occasioned by defendant's blasting. In refusing to enjoin the operation
of the mill in such manner as to prevent the escape of all
slate dust, the court, by Judge Hand, said:
"The very right on which the injured party stands in such
cases is a quantitative compromise between two conflicting interests. What may be an entirely tolerable adjustment, when the
result is only to award damages for the injury done, may become
no better than a means of extortion if the result is absolutely to
curtail the defendant's enjoyment of his land. Even though the
defendant has no power to condemn, at times it may be proper
to require of him no more than to make good the whole injury
once and for all. * * * To say that whenever an injured party
can show that he could recover damages he has only in addition
to prove that the tort will be repeated, appears to us to ignore
the substance of the situation in the interest of an apocryphal
consistency."

An injunction, restraining the conduct of a business
that is utilizing the latest and best devices, methods and
processes in an effort to avoid injury to the property of
others, imposes upon the enjoined defendant a choice of
equally uninviting alternatives. Defendant must either
acquire at an exorbitant price the right to inflict the injuries complained of or cease the conduct of its business.
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Either course involves marked hardship to defendant,
economic waste and, at times, widespread social distress.
This is the "substance of the situation" of which Judge
Hand speaks and the true ground of decision in those
cases where the courts have compared hardships and refused injunctive relief.
The courts have not undertaken to supply a precise
standard of measurement wherewith the quantitative
superiority of defendant's "hardships" is to be compared
in determining whether the injunction should issue or be
refused. This has led to confusion, real or apparent, in
the decisions of particular jurisdictions, but, it is believed
that such a result is more or less unavoidable, as in matters of judicial discretion, reasonableness must remain the
ultimate standard. It seems certain, however, that the
anticipated loss to defendant must be pecuniarily greater
than the gain to complainant if the injunction issues. The
courts will not refuse to interfere if to do so will operate
to restore to the complainant property or property rights
that complainant can use or exercise with as much
pecuniary profit as can the defendant.
That the state of mind or motive of the complainant
is at times a consideration sufficiently cogent to induce the
chancellor to withhold injunctive relief is discoverable in
the opinion of Justice Cooley in Edwards v. dllouez
Mining Co., 38 Mich., 46. Defendant owned a stamping mill which it had erected and equipped at a cost of
$60,000. Its operation resulted in the discharge of large
quantities of sand into Hill Creek, some of which was
deposited upon the bottom lands below. Complainant
purchased land a short distance below the mill about one
year after the mill was put in operation. Complainant
had made several unsuccessful attempts to sell his land to
defendant. The court, in affirming the decree of the trial
court dismissing the bill for an injunction, said:
"The land injured in this case was bought by the complainant
with the preconceived purpose to force a sale of it upon the de-
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fendant. He did not want it for a homestead or for business
property, but for the money that he could compel the defendant
to pay for it. * * * In general it must be assumed that the rules
of the common law will give adequate redress for any injury; and
when the litigant avers that under the circumstances of his particular case they do not, and that therefore the gracious ear of
equity should incline to hear his complaint, it may not be amiss to
inquire how he came to be placed in such circumstances."

Finally it may be noted that the courts will issue an
injunction vs. an encroaching defendant that has a right
to acquire by eminent domain proceedings the property
wrongfully appropriated, unless such defendant shall
have compensated the complainant or given security for
such compensation. However, the particular conditions
of the injunction will depend very largely on the peculiar
constitutional and statutory provisions of the jurisdiction.

